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I. INTRODUCTION
This short essay is adapted from introductory comments de-
livered at the Second Annual Law Professors' Colloquium, held
" Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. Many thanks to the Uni-
versity of Miami Law School for its kindness and generosity in hosting this Second An-
nual Law Professors' Colloquium being held in conjunction with the Hispanic National
Bar Association's Annual Meeting. Special thanks to Frank Valdes for his indefatigable
work and amazing organizational concentration and skill; Lisa Iglesias who, together
with Frank, organized this wonderful Colloquium; and to University of Miami School of
Law Dean Sam Thompson without whose support this type of event could not take place.
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in Miami, Florida in conjunction with the Hispanic Bar Associa-
tion's Annual Meeting. The Colloquium, "International Law,
Human Rights, and LatCrit theory," focused on understanding
how, why, and with what theoretical, political, and practical
implications, the critical concerns of the LatCrit movement in-
tersect with key issues of international law and human rights.
To explore the relevance of human rights to LatCrit theory,
this Colloquium is conveniently organized into three panels rep-
resenting the three so-called generations of rights: civil and po-
litical rights (the first generation); social, economic, and cultural
rights (the second generation); and solidarity or collective rights
(the third generation). However, at best, it is naive to claim that
clear distinctions as to the character and nature of rights exist so
as to permit inflexible, clearly delineated, generational classifi-
cations. Rather, as human rights instruments recognize, all
human rights are indivisible and interdependent '-notions in-
valuable to the LatCrit discourse which were recently reiterated
in the Vienna Declaration, the consensus document that
emerged from the 1993 United Nations World Conference on
Human Rights held in Vienna, Austria. The Vienna Declaration
plainly states that "[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible
and inter-dependent and interrelated."
2
To be sure, the rights of free expression, free association,
and free exercise-quintessential examples of the civil and po-
litical rights of the first generation-are at best meaningless
without the health, education, and social security rights-all of
the second generation. Similarly, these health, education, and
social security rights are illusory without the peace or environ-
ment to facilitate them. Moreover, trade union rights and prop-
erty rights can be viewed as either (or both) civil and political or
social and economic rights.
1. Significantly, based on this notion of indivisibility and interdependence of
rights, the United Nations General Assembly called upon the United Nations Commis-
sion on Human Rights to adopt a single convention on human rights. G.A. Res. 421 (V),
U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). Because of disagreements as to the
obligatory nature of social and economic rights between industrialized and developing
nations, the one contemplated covenant was fragmented into two documents--one ad-
dressing civil and political rights and the other addressing social, economic, and cultural
rights.
2. Vienna Declaration and Programme, U.N. GAOR, World Conference on Human
Rights, 48th Sess., pt. 1, para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 157/23 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
1661 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration].
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Attesting to the indivisibility and interdependence construct,
the European system 3 considers the right to education and cul-
tural rights as part of the civil and political rights construct, but
interestingly, they do not appear in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).4 Rather, they appear in
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (Economic Covenant). 5 Moreover, there are myriad sig-
nificant documents in which the first, second, and third genera-
tion rights coexist, such as in the Children's Convention, 6 the
Women's Convention,7 the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 8 and the African Charter.9
Thus, a human rights construct makes sense only with a holistic
reading of rights that truly allows the enjoyment of the aspira-
tional dignity that attaches to our status as human.
Nonetheless, in order to organize presentations, this Collo-
quium uses the generational structure while concurrently de-
bunking it. Every panel will, in some fashion, address all the
"generations" of rights. For example, take immigration status-
a much maligned status in the hallowed halls of Congress in the
recent past. An appropriate question to ask, one of great impor-
tance and relevance to the LatCrit paradigm, is whether, in light
of international human rights norms, the United States as a soy-
3. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222
[hereinafter European Convention]. See also American Convention on Human Rights,
opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 (entered into force July 18, 1978),
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970)[hereinafter American Convention].
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, ratified by the United States June 8,
1992) [hereinafter ICCPR].
5. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter
Economic Convention].
6. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.
49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/441736 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989) [hereinafter
Children's Convention].
7. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 (entered into force on Sept. 3, 1981)
reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980)[hereinafter Women's Convention].
8. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969)
[hereinafter Race Convention].
9. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, O.A.U.
Doc. CAB[LEG/67/31 Rev. 5 (1981) (entered into force on Oct. 21, 1986), reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 59 (1981)[hereinafter African Charter].
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ereign enjoys the sovereign right to deny health, education, and
welfare services/benefits to persons based upon their immigra-
tion status? And what insights can LatCrit offer in light of such
dilemmas?
This brief introduction to the first panel, which will focus on
civil and political rights, has three aims. First, it will introduce
the theme of this panel and present some preliminary consid-
erations concerning the so-called first generation of international
human rights law. Second, this article will articulate the three
questions the panelists were asked to keep in mind in the course
of the preparation of their remarks. Finally, this preface will in-
troduce the panelists, preview the rights that they will each ad-
dress, and suggest some themes that show the inter-connections
between and inter-relatedness of the concerns of international
human rights law and LatCrit theory.
II. THE FRAMEWORK: INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS LAW
International human rights are those rights vital to an in-
dividual's existence; they are fundamental, inviolable, interde-
pendent, indivisible, and inalienable rights. Simply put, they
are predicates to life as human beings.' 0 Human rights are
moral, social, religious, and political rights that concern respect
and dignity associated with personhood and a human being's
identity. 11
The origins of the concept of human rights, a relatively re-
cent, modern concept, are based in religion, "natural law, [and]
contemporary moral values."'12 The foundation for human rights
is the individual's status qua individual within the international
community and the dignity and justice owed to persons based
upon that status.
13
10. Berta E. Hernfindez, To Bear or Not to Bear: Reproductive Freedom As an In-
ternational Human Right, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 309 (1991). See also REBECCA M.
WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 175 (1986) ("Human rights ... are regarded as those fun-
damental and inalienable rights which are essential for life as a human being.").
11. See generally supra note 10.
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 701 cmt. b (1987).
13. But see Rhoda E. Howard, Dignity, Community, and Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 81, 82 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'Im ed., 1992)
(differentiating among human rights, dignity, and justice).
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Justice and human dignity are concepts central to any con-
ception of the rights of individuals. For example, the notion of
social justice is inherent in the nondiscrimination norms. Simi-
larly, human dignity elevates human rights to a universal level
of inviolability in the public and private spheres. Consequently,
there can be no challenge to the universal acceptance that, for
example, genocide, race discrimination, and terrorism are wrong
and universally condemned,' 4 regardless of whether the actors
are states or private persons and regardless of the victims' na-
tionality.
In the beginning, individual human rights were not part of
the international law paradigm. Rather, the concern of interna-
tional affairs was left exclusively to the state. Such notions
notwithstanding, early writers recognized the importance of in-
dividuals to the Law of Nations because individuals are "the per-
sonal basis of every State" and, consequently, international law
must "provide certain rules regarding individuals."'15 Individu-
als, however, were deemed to be objects, and not subjects, of the
Law of Nations. 16
A. Historical Background of the Development of
Civil and Political Rights
History traces the development of rules to deal with rela-
tionships between or among different peoples to the end of the
Roman Empire at which time the emergence of independent and
separate states required the development of rules that guided
sovereigns' interactions with one another. 17  Thereafter, in-
14. This is not to say, however, that universality as opposed to relativity, at least as
originally articulated, represent the appropriate analytical paradigm. For a discussion
on the universality versus relativity debate, see Berta Esperanza Herndndez.Truyol,
Women's Rights As Human Rights - Rules, Realities and the Role of Culture: A Formula
for Reform, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 605, 657-67, 657 n.201 (1996).
15. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 362-69 (2d ed. 1912), reprinted in Louis
B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1
(1973).
16. Id. § 290.
17. See generally Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW at xxii-xxiii (3d ed.
1993); COVEY T. OLIVER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 1390 (4th ed. 1995). The jus gentium system that the Roman Empire had devel-
oped to govern the relations between Roman and non-Roman citizens, which (contrasted
with the jus civile, which applied between or among Roman citizens) was modeled on the
Roman system and incorporated principles of equity and natural law. Contemporary
scholars analogize the jus gentiuni to the source of international law called "General
1996-97]
228 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:2
creased trade, improvements in navigation, and the discovery of
new lands accelerated the development of the new law of na-
tions.' 8 The diversity of peoples and ideologies also required or-
derly processes for state-to-state communications and inter-
changes.19
The emergence of human rights law is traced to "premodern
natural law doctrines of Greek Stoicism." 20 Although later con-
ceptions of natural law included theories of natural rights, early
views emphasized duties of "man."21  Natural law philosophy
also had religious foundations which posited that all human laws
derive from, and are subordinate to, the law of God.22 Intrinsi-
Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations" contained in Article 38 of the Statute
of the Court of International Justice.
18. HENKIN, supra note 17, at xxii, xxiii. Another significant historic event in the
evolution of international law is the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) in Central Europe
which marked the emergence of independent nation-states as the primary actors in the
global setting underscoring the need to create norms to govern interactions between and
among sovereign equals. James Friedberg, An Historical and Critical Introduction to
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION 1600-PRESENT 2 (John A.
Maxwell & James J. Friedberg eds., 2d ed. 1994).
19. Friedberg, supra note 18 (quoting Grotius). Indeed, in the seventeenth century
Grotius's visionary statement: "Human rights norms must exist today in a diverse world
of immensely varied ideologies and beliefs"-effectively predicted the development of a
sophisticated human rights system. Id. Hugo Grotius, an important international jurist
who was guided by natural law, provided a bridge to the positivists' theoretical founda-
tions that followed the natural law epoch. Grotius distinguished between natural law
and the customary law of nations based on the conduct and will of nations. As "a ra-
tionalist who derives the principles of the law of nature from universal reason rather
than from divine authority," HENKIN, supra note 17, at xxiv, Grotius' natural law concept
was secular and was based on "man's" rationality rather than revelation and deduction of
God's will. OLIVER, supra note 17, at 1391.
20. Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 21, 22 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1994) (stating that "the
school of philosophy ... which held that a universal working force pervades all creation
and that human conduct therefore should be judged according to, and brought into har-
mony with, the law of nature.").
21. See generally MYRES MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 68-71, 73-75
(1980), excerpted in FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS 167-68 (2d ed. 1990). The underpinnings of natural law are assumptions that
there are laws existing in nature-both theological and metaphysical-that confer rights
upon individuals as human beings. The two sources for these rights are either in divine
will or metaphysical absolutes, and they are deemed to constitute a higher law than is
identified with all of humankind and requires protections of individual rights. An under-
lying assumption of natural law is that there is a common human nature that presup-
poses the equality of all human beings.
22. HENKIN, supra note 17, at xxiv. Thomas Aquinas, for example, viewed the law
of nature as "a body of permanent principles grounded in the Divine Order, and partly
revealed in the Scripture." In his thirteenth century writings, Aquinas even noted the
notion that one sovereign could interfere in the internal affairs of another when one mis-
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cally contradictory to any notion of human rights was the recog-
nition of the legitimacy of slavery and serfdom-concepts anath-
ema to the notion of human rights, liberty, freedom, equality,
and dignity that are at the heart of human rights as viewed to-
day.
23
From the early days, the view of these rights of "man" as
inalienable was reflected in the language in which they were
couched. For example, Locke argued that "certain rights self-
evidently pertain to individuals as human beings ... that chief
among them are the rights to life, liberty (freedom from arbi-
trary rule), and property" 24 and that individuals in civil society
only ceded to states the right to enforce these natural rights, not
the rights themselves. If the state does not safeguard the rights,
it will give "rise to a right to responsible, popular revolution."
25
The shift from natural law to positivism signified that the
focus of states' conduct would be on what states did in practice
rather than what occurred based upon forces existing in na-
ture. 26 The value of the positivists' contributions to the develop-
ment of human rights law lies in their recognition of the impor-
tance of organizing rules by established processes of the states.
Its weakness, however, lies in the fact that the values promoted
as human rights become wholly dependent upon the perspective
of the governing elite.27 Thus, under a positivist model, human
dignity is what a state makes it.
The reality is that the evolution of rights recognized both
positive and natural law. Certainly, there was acceptance of a
state's sovereignty over its own subjects; however, the suprasov-
ereign nature of the inviolability of a human being was also rec-
treats its subjects. Michael J. Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Inter-
vention in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547,
570-74 (1987) (quoting Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humani-
tarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
203, 214 (1974)). This religious view of the natural law was carried forward by Spanish
theologians Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco SuArez, both of whom recognized that be-
yond individual states there existed a community of states that was governed in their
interactions with each other by international rules that were found "by rational deriva-
tion from basic moral principles of divine origin." OLIVER, supra note 17, at 1390-91. See
also HENKIN, supra note 17, at xxiv.
23. Weston, supra note 20, at 22.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. HENKIN, supra note 17, at xxv. The popularity of positivism corresponds to the
rise of the nation-state and the view of the state as independent and sovereign. Id.
27. See generally McDoUGAL, supra note 21.
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ognized. As one writer plainly stated, "[if] a tyrant practices
atrocities towards his subjects, which no just man can approve,
the right of human social connection is not cut off in such case."
28
The contemporary conceptualization of human rights, such
as the rights to life, liberty, and equality, remained unarticu-
lated until the last decades of the eighteenth century when they
emerged contemporaneously with the institutionalization of
democratic forms of government. 29 This was a time when politi-
cal and social uprisings sought to identify and particularize
those impermissible governmental intrusions into individuals'
rights. Such movement is symbolized and embodied in the
American Declaration of Independence3 ° and the French Decla-
ration of Les Droits de l'Homme. 31 These rights, however,
28. Bazyler, supra note 22 (quoting Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Esti Pacis 438
(William Whewell trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1853) (1625)). See also Emmerich de
Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, ou Principles de la Loi Naturelle, Appliqu6s a la Conduite et
aux Affairs des Nations et de Sovereigns (1758), reprinted in Covey T. Oliver, et al. Cases
and Materials on the International Legal System 742 (4th ed. 1995). De Vattel articu-
lates in section 71 some of the early notions of human rights law:
Whoever uses a citizen ill, indirectly offends the state, which is bound to pro-
tect this citizen; and the sovereign of the latter should avenge his wrongs,
punish the aggressor, and, if possible, oblige him to make full reparation;
since otherwise the citizen would not obtain the great end of the civil asso-
ciation, which is, safety.
Id. § 71. Section 72 states:
[b]ut, on the other hand, the nation or the sovereign, ought not to suffer the
citizens to do an injury to the subjects of another state, much less to offend
that state itself: and this, not only because no sovereign ought to permit
those who are under his command to violate the precepts of the law of na-
ture, which forbids all injuries, but also because nations ought mutually to
respect each other, to abstain from all offense from all injury, from all wrong,
in a word, from every thing that may be of prejudice to others. If a sovereign,
who might keep his subjects within the rules of justice and peace, suffers
them to injure a foreign nation either in its body or its members, he does no
less injury to that nation than if he injured it himself. In short, the safety of
the state, and that of human society, requires this attention from every sov-
ereign. If you let loose the reigns to your subjects against foreign nations,
these will behave in the same manner to you; and instead of that friendly in-
tercourse which nature has established between all men, we shall see noth-
ing but one vast and dreadful scene of plunder between nation and nation.
Id. §72.
29. GERHARD vON GLAHN, LAWAMONG NATIONS 185 (4th ed. 1981).
30. The inalienability and inviolability of rights that Locke addressed and the natu-
ral law roots of these rights is also reflected in the language of the American Declaration
of Independence, which proclaims the self-evident truth "that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness." THE DECLARATION OF INDE-
PENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
31. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of August 16, 1789
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emerged at a time when all women and all slaves were mere
chattel--conditions anathema to the very rights being articu-
lated, developed, and embraced.
Early examples of express protection of individuals, predat-
ing even the democratic movements, include the seventeenth
century negotiations by Catholic princes to ensure appropriate
treatment of Catholics by Protestant princes and vice versa.
32
These agreements were precursors of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century treaties concluded by states which pro-
tected the rights of certain classes, mostly minority groups (i.e.,
persons of a different race, religion, or language from the major-
ity group) within a state33 and which abolished slavery.34 These
also reveals its natural law roots. That document provides that "men are born and re-
main free and equal in rights.., the aim of every political association is the preservation
of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man ... [which are] Liberty, Property, Safety
and Resistance to oppression." THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN
(Fr. 1789). Liberty is defined to include the right to free speech, freedom of association,
religious freedom, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and confinement. Id.
32. HENKIN, supra note 17, at 596-97.
33. VON GLAHN, supra note 29, at 185-86. See also HENKIN, supra note 17, at 597. A
major step in the protection of individuals' rights is evident in the peace treaties of 1919
which provided guarantees of fair treatment to the inhabitants of mandated territories
and certain racial minorities in eastern and central Europe. Another landmark is the
establishment of the International Labor Organization (ILO), the purpose of which was
(and continues to be) the improvement of working conditions throughout the world. The
origins of these actions can be traced to the period after the First World War when
changes in sovereign boundaries required the expansion of rights to minorities because of
the rise of nationalistic sentiments which created a real danger of oppression against ra-
cial, ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities. Consequently, the allied and associated
powers, such as Czechoslovakia, Austria, Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Turkey,
Rumania, and Yugoslavia, concluded a number of treaties whereby those states promised
to treat minority groups justly and equally. At a later time, Albania, Estonia, Iraq, Lat-
via, and Lithuania gave similar guarantees as conditions of their admission to the
League of Nations. See generally MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST
52 (June 1963).
34. Conventional views date the recognition of freedom from slavery as a customary
international norm to 1915. This norm was re-affirmed in international conventions
such as the 1926 Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253
(entered into force Mar. 9, 1927); 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7,
1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Apr. 30, 1957). For subsequent
treaties further prohibiting the traffic of women and children, see International Conven-
tion for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, 9 L.N.T.S. 416 (1923);
1947 Protocol, 53 U.N.T.S. 13 (1947). By 1955, it had been affirmed in the General Act of
the Berlin Conference on Central Africa that "trading in slaves is forbidden in conformity
with the principles of international law." RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS 1 (2d ed. 1991). Thirty-four years later, the Brussels Conference condemned slave
trade and also agreed on measures for the suppression of such practices, which included
"granting of reciprocal rights of search, and the capture and trial of slave ships." Id.
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early manifestations of the importance of protecting minority
groups even within a sovereign provide historical momentum,
utility, and support to a LatCrit proposal that rights of Lati-
nas/os in this country, citizens, and noncitizens alike, merit and
warrant protection from state intrusion.
Those treaty obligations notwithstanding, in the early devel-
opment of human rights law, states mainly observed their com-
mitments in the breach. States considered such provisions as in-
trusions into their national sovereignty 35-the same arguments
presently echoed in the current nativistic legislative and con-
gressional trends to curve non-citizens' access to basic services
such as health, education, social security, and welfare. But even
then, in light of breaches of minority treaty provisions and pre-
vailing statist principles, an early writer listed the following
"rights of mankind" as guaranteed to all individuals in their
state of nationality as well as by foreign sovereigns pursuant to
the Law of Nations: "right of existence, the right to protection of
honour, life, health, liberty, and property, the right of practising
any religion one likes, the right of emigration and the like."
36
The truly revolutionary events in human rights development
followed the Second World War after which emerged the unique
acceptance of individuals in se, and not only states (even if on
behalf of, or having an impact on, individuals), as primary actors
in the global sphere, rendering individuals both objects and sub-
jects of law and its enforcement. 37 As a noted scholar has re-
35. This attitude of states resulted in the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice's (PCIJ) reiteration that discrimination against minorities within a state constituted
a violation of obligations under the treaties. See Advisory Opinion No. 6, German Set-
tlers, 1923 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B) No. 6 (Sept. 10); Advisory Opinion No. 44, Treatment of Pol-
ish Nationals in Danzig, 1932 P.C.I.J., (Ser. A/B) No. 44 (Feb. 4); Advisory Opinion No.
64, Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 64 (Apr. 6).
36. OPPENHEIM, supra note 15, § 292 reprinted in LOUIS B. SOHN & THOMAS
BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (1973). After providing
such a catalogue of rights, Oppenheim fretted that those rights could not be guaranteed
by the Law of Nations because individuals cannot be subjects of law that is limited to
relations between states. Yet, he also recognized the suprasovereign nature of "human"
rights in the statement that:
there is no doubt that, should a state venture to treat its own subjects or a
part thereof with such cruelty as would stagger humanity, public opinion of
the rest of the world would call upon the Powers to exercise intervention for
the purpose of compelling such state to establish a legal order of things
within its boundaries sufficient to guarantee to its citizens an existence more
adequate to the ideas of modern civilisation.
Id.
37. See generally 1 WHITEMAN, supra note 33, at 51 (quoting CHARLES DE VISSCHER,
232 [Vol. 28:2
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ported:
Before the Second World War, scholars and diplomats as-
sumed that international law allowed each equal sovereign an
equal right to be monstrous to his subjects. Summary execu-
tion, torture, conviction without due process (or any process,
for that matter) were legally significant events only if the vic-
tim of such official eccentricities were the citizen of another
state. In that case, international law treated him as the
bearer not of personal rights but of rights belonging to his
government, and ultimately to the state for which it tempo-
rarily spoke.
38
This modern view of human rights, placing the individual at
the center, emerged in 1945 in the wake of the Nuremberg and
Tokyo trials and the vivid awareness of the Nazi human rights
atrocities. 39 Nuremberg clearly established that rules of inter-
national law applied to individuals. In a now famous and oft-
quoted phrase, the Tribunal provided that "[crimes against in-
ternational law are committed by men, not by abstract entities
and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can
the provisions of international law be enforced."
4
With the signing of the United Nations Charter in 1945, in-
ternational law structurally protected individuals qua individu-
als against all forms of injustice regardless of whether the abuse
or injustice was committed by a foreign sovereign or the indi-
viduals' own state of nationality. 4' As such, these rights are
permanent and universal and are ingrained as a purpose of the
United Nations Charter to "promot[e] and encourag[e] respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 125, n.8 (P. E. Corbett trans.,
1957)).
38. TOM FARER, HUMAN RIGHTS BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN INTER-
AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: TEN YEARS OF ACTIVITIES 1971-1981, at v-vi
(1982), reprinted in RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 33-35 (2d ed.
1991).
39. See Hernhndez, supra note 10, at 320-325; Louis B. Sohn, The New Interno-
tional Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV.
1, 9-10 (1982).
40. Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946).
41. See generally MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 75-76 (5th ed. 1984). Prior to that, as the peace treaties and the treaties with re-
spect to slavery and the slave trade show, the concentration was on remedying specific
abuses or protecting particular groups.
1996-971
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distinction as to race, sex, language or religions .... "42 Signifi-
cantly, the universality of rights is founded in Western philoso-
phy and thus open to attack for lacking Southern, Eastern, or
African linkages.
This philosophical schism gave rise to another noteworthy
post-World War II event which is relevant to an international
law and LatCrit analysis of rights: the polarization of the eco-
nomic development of states. 4 Programs of aid that were envi-
sioned without an understanding of the varying cultures and
problems in various countries failed and led to schisms in theory
and practice. Such gaps are evident today in efforts ranging
from the Maquiladora projects to the United States' so-called
immigration reform.
More recently, post-Cold War discord and its attendant re-
sults of increased nationalism, ethnic strife, civil wars, and hu-
man rights abuses for which the community of nations was not
prepared, have presented a grave challenge to the continued de-
velopment of human rights law. These concerns are also evident
today in the United States, not only in its national, but its inter-
national policies as well.
Another document that creates human rights obligations
that are pertinent to this Colloquium is the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (Universal Declaration)." The Universal
42. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3. See also other U.N. Charter provisions that con-
firm it as a watershed moment in the internationalization of human rights. The pream-
ble provides that the members "reaffirm [their] faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of
nations large and small [as well as the institution's goal] to promote social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom." Id. Preamble. In addition, Article 55 man-
dates that the United Nations promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion." Id. art. 55. To achieve this end, the state members "pledge themselves to take
joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement" of
such purposes. Id. art. 56.
43. The second panel of this Colloquium on social, economic and cultural rights, as
well as the third panel on solidarity rights, will address this theme more directly.
44. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/180
(1948)[hereinafter Universal Declaration]. Although there is ongoing debate on the legal
status of the Universal Declaration, many scholars consider it to be legally binding as a
general principle of international law while others consider it to have the status of jus
cogens--a peremptory norm. CHERIF BASSIOuNI, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE xxiv (1994). Moreover, notwithstanding that
at its adoption the U.S. representative stated that the Declaration "is not and does not
purport to be a statement of law or of legal obligation," (19 Dep't of State Bulletin 751
(1948)). Subsequent developments in both domestic and international law confirm the
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Declaration is significant and noteworthy because it is a com-
prehensive document that addresses, not only civil and political
rights, but also economic, social, and cultural rights-a testa-
ment to the indivisibility and interdependence of rights. 45 In-
cluded in the Universal Declaration's protections of civil and po-
litical rights are the prohibition of slavery, inhuman treatment,
arbitrary arrest, and arbitrary interference with privacy, as well
as a broad, nondiscrimination provision that mandates equality
on the grounds of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other
status. In addition, the Universal Declaration provides for
rights to a fair trial, to freedom of movement and residence, to
political asylum, to have and change nationality, to marry, to
own property, to freedom of belief and worship, to freedom of
opinion and expression, to freedom of peaceful assembly and as-
sociation, to free elections, and to equal opportunities for access
to public positions. As to social, economic, and cultural rights,
the Universal Declaration recognizes the rights to social secu-
rity, full employment, fair working conditions, an adequate stan-
dard of living, education, and participation in the cultural life of
the community.
46
B. Civil and Political Rights
On December 16, 1966, the General Assembly adopted and
opened for signature, ratification, and accession the ICCPR, the
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, and the Economic Covenant.
47
The ICCPR is most pertinent to this panel because it, together
with the Universal Declaration, is the document that articulates
the civil and political rights of individuals. For example, the
ICCPR's prohibition against the suspension of certain rights by
the state, even in the event of public emergencies that threaten
the life of the nation, reflects the notion of the inalienability of
Declaration's status as a statement of customary international law. See LOUIS B. SOHN &
THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 518-19, 522
(1973).
45. For a discussion of the different types of rights, see Berta E. HernAndez-Truyol,
Human Rights Through a Gendered Lens.- Emergence, Evolution, Revolution, in WOMEN'S
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A REFERENCE GUIDE (Kelly Askin & Dorean Koenig eds.,
forthcoming 1997).
46. See Universal Declaration, supra note 44 passim. See also SOHN & BUER-
GENTHAL, supra note 44, at 516; AKEHURST, supra note 41, at 76-77.
47. See ICCPR, supra note 4.
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rights. Such rights include the right to life; freedom from torture
or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; free-
dom from slavery and servitude; nonapplicability of retroactive
laws; right to recognition as a person before the law; and the
right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion."
Civil and political rights comprise the so-called first genera-
tion. Ironically, and aptly, called "the rights of Man," these
rights were in their apogee starting in the eighteenth century
when, among others, women had no rights. These rights are
traced to the "bourgeois" revolutions, particularly the French and
American Revolutions in the last quarter of the eighteenth cen-
tury that gave rise to the Declarations which are viewed as the
foundation of this group of rights.49
Civil and political rights originally were conceived as nega-
tive rights, which meant freedom from governmental interfer-
ence in the various realms. Rights that fall into this negative
construct include the freedom of opinion, conscience, religion,
expression, the press, assembly, movement, from arbitrary de-
tention or arrest, interference with correspondence, and the right
to property. 50 However, such a conception of negative rights is
exceedingly and misleadingly limiting as civil and political rights
also include some rights that can be categorized as positive be-
cause they require some action by the state, such as the right to
48. Id. arts. 6, 7, 8(l)-(2), 15, 16, and 18. Aside from the U.N. Charter, the Univer-
sal Declaration, the ICCPR, and the Economic Covenant, a rich body of human rights
treaties, including regional human rights systems, exists. Other significant treaties in-
clude the Women's Convention, supra note 7; Race Convention, supra note 8; Interna-
tional Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, U.N. Doc. A/Res/39146 (1984) (entered into force
June 26, 1987), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984); Children's Convention, supra note 6.
49. Stephen P. Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?,
33 RUTGERS L. REv. 435, 437 (1981) (stating that "the commonly recognized starting
point for the emergence of international human rights as we know them today is the
movement for the 'rights of man' in eighteenth century Europe."). Significantly, notwith-
standing these origins, Marks notes that he does not suggest "that the concept of human
rights is exclusively or even essentially Western. All cultures and civilizations in one
way or another have defined rights and duties of man in society on the basis of certain
elementary notions of equality, justice, dignity, and worth of the individual (or of the
group)." Id. at 437 (citing UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL
ORGANIZATION, BIRTHRIGHT OF MAN (1969); HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND INTER-
PRETATIONS (1949)).
50. Id. at 438. It appears that the right to property properly belongs as a civil and
political right; however, it can easily be viewed as an economic right. Interestingly, it is
often placed under the civil and political rights because property was central to the inter-
est fought for in the French and American Revolutions.
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participate in free elections and the right to a fair trial. The
nondiscrimination provision in the ICCPR, the UN Charter, and
the Universal Declarations-prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of race, gender, language, religion, culture, family, ethnic-
ity, national origin, and social origin-make clear that all per-
sons enjoy these rights.
Notwithstanding the universality of civil and political rights,
the development of these rights has been nationalized, politi-
cized, and gendered. The notion of human rights that emerged,
rather than being universal, was normative; the norm was the
white, Anglo, Western, European, Judeo-Christian, educated,
propertied, heterosexual, able-bodied male. The Western domi-
nation in the development and articulation of law has resulted in
challenges to its validity, authenticity, and universality with the
conception of universality frequently meeting with resistance
from representatives of different cultures and ideologies. 51 Civil
and political rights are meaningless to a population that cannot
exercise them. Rights of this first generation have been criti-
cized as being "meant for the majority of the working class and
peoples of conquered lands, the right to be exploited and colo-
nized. They were regarded as 'formal' freedoms that neglected
the material realities of social conditions. 52
Today, world events following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the
break-up of the Soviet Union, the virtual end of communism, and
the destabilizing global consequences of these occurrences, in-
cluding regional strife, ethnic and religious wars, genocide and
ethnic cleansing, and a turn towards nativism, nationalism, and
isolationism in politics, governance, and trade, indicate that
global society is in a second revolutionary stage, even from a
traditionalist human rights perspective. This last decade of the
twentieth century thus becomes but a beginning of a new era for
human rights law. In such a context, this Colloquium can and
will articulate the great expectations for years to follow-a vision
of a great future for all persons in the world; where women and
men of all races, religions, ethnicities, sexualities, abilities,
classes, colors, and cultures can elect and be elected representa-
tives of society; where cultures and people are protected, valued,
51. Asbjorn Eide & Allan Rosas, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A Universal
Challenge 21, 23, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Asbjern Eide et al. eds.,
1995).
52. Marks, supra note 49, at 438.
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and heard; where poverty, malnutrition, and premature deaths
are eliminated; where not only boys, but also girls are healthy,
well-fed, cared-for, valued, and educated; and where Latinas/os
(and all "others") form an integral part of the social construct
and are significant participants in any existing social contract.
III. THE QUESTIONS: CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
The Civil and Political Rights panel will explore whether
LatCrit theory can further the theoretical and practical work of
promoting civil and political rights in both the domestic and in-
ternational arenas, particularly in light of the United States Su-
preme Court's recent constitutional jurisprudence effecting a
dramatic contraction of certain individual rights in this country.
The following questions were offered to the speakers to present a
framework within which to explore this theme.
1. Does a LatCrit theoretical perspective on identity politics,
the multiplicity and intersectionality of Latina/o identities and
cultural values as well as the convergences and divergences in
our histories and discourses of assimilation, independence and
revolution offer new perspectives on the traditional themes
and concerns that have organized the legal and political
struggle to promote the recognition and enforcement of human
rights, broadly conceived?
Significant themes raised by this inquiry include the theo-
retical and historic origins of the particular generation, here the
first generation, of human rights. LatCrit can be instrumental
in suggesting and proposing ways to conceptualize differences
and commonalties in designing an agenda to promote the recog-
nition and enforcement of human rights in domestic and inter-
national fora. For example, international human rights instru-
ments expressly recognize the indivisibility, interdependence,
and inviolability of rights. This paradigm is well-suited to Lat-
Crit analysis as it supports the multidimensional nature of Lati-
nas/os' identities. Thus, international human rights norms' pro-
tection against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color,
culture, and language serves Latinas/os well because their iden-
tities are the combination of many of the protected characteris-
[Vol. 28:2
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
tics, not the fragmentation of them as U.S. law would have it.5s
2. Does LatCrit theory offer new perspectives on the recent
trend toward regional economic integration and the likely im-
pact of such developments on the human rights of Latinas/os
within the United States, at the borders, and within the Latin
American states considering regional integration?
This query insinuates that international human rights law
provides a fulcrum from which to take a global perspective that
encourages diversity of analysis rather than a parochial and na-
tionalistic perspective that eschews others and insists on a pre-
ordained hierarchical normativity. What would happen, for ex-
ample, if one were to focus on the border crossing issues from a
Mexican worker's perspective instead of taking an irate Estado
Unidense outlook? Rather than hear the cacophonous sounds of
nativistic voices from this side of the border, which attempt to
convince others that the so-called "illegal aliens" are stealing
American jobs (jobs which in reality involve performing tasks no
"American" worker wants to carry out), one might simply hear
the voices of concerned mothers and fathers whose family values
render them willing to risk their lives for the sake of making a
living at a job that will enable them to feed, clothe, and educate
their children-a task not possible in their country and a risk
easily understood when one compares the U.S. $4.00 per day
wages earned in their countries working for U.S. companies to
the U.S. $4.00 per hour wages earned by simply crossing the
border.
3. Does LatCrit theory have anything to say about the key de-
bates over (a) the status of national sovereignty in interna-
53. See, e.g., Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (the
court held that a black woman claiming discrimination based upon a company policy that
prohibited her wearing braided hair could not conflate her identities (i.e., her blackness
and her womanness to enhance her case in court), and the court, noting that corn-rowed
hair was made popular by Bo Derek, found the policy was not discriminatory against
women or blacks). See also, Paulette Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectiues on the Intersec-
tion of Race and Gender, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CU'TTING EDGE (Richard Delgado
ed., 1995) (discussing the Rogers case); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado
ed., 1995) (addressing the intersection of race, sex and class); Berta E. Hernindez-
Truyol, Indivisible Identities: Culture Clashes, Confused Constructs and Reality Checks, 2
HARV. LATINO L. REV. (forthcoming 1996) (applying the indivisibility and interdepend-
ence construct to Latinas/os' identities).
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tional law, (b) the proper scope and limits of state interven-
tion in civil society, and (c) the status of international human
rights in regional agreements such as free trade agreements
or procedural norms for the enforcement of international hu-
man rights?
LatCrit, and in particular the Latinas/os and Asian-
American colleagues and coworkers, as well as other hyphenated
"Americans," may have an especially valuable contribution to
make because of our conflated North/South and East/West iden-
tities. To us, with our trans/international roots, origins, and
families, and our multilingualism, national sovereignty takes a
different form. We can all ask which part of a national identity
or which of our nations a particular concern/policy triggers, since
our claim to citizenship is not homo-national. With such multi-
plicity claims, again the indivisibility and interdependence
paradigm of international human rights norms is both construc-
tive and instructive. For one, national origin and its indicia such
as language are expressly protected classifications in the inter-
national sphere. For another, the very notion of sovereignty and
citizenship gets confused when in border raids in the United
States, both Mexican nationals and U.S. nationals of Mexican
ancestry get rounded up and herded out-simply because of their
physical traits-regardless of nationhood. 54
In addition, the notion of the individual in the global text is
a concept broader than citizenship with protections of individu-
als based on their personhood, 55 not their citizenship. Signifi-
cantly, all states, not just the state of nationality, owe all peo-
ples, not just their citizens, these international protections.
Finally, the lesson from Nuremberg and its progeny is that state
sovereignty cedes to human rights protections. Consequently,
international human rights norms set the proper baseline scope
and limits of state intervention in civil society as well as the
threshold observance of such rights in any regional or interna-
tional agreement.
54. See Elvia R. Arriola, LatCrit Theory, International Human Rights, Popular Cul.
ture and the Faces of Despair in INS Raids, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 245 (1996-
97).
55. For a discussion on the international legal protections of persons, rather than
the narrower class of citizens, see Berta E. HernAndez-Truyol, Reconciling Rights in Col.
lision: An International Human Rights Strategy, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM
AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 263-64 (Juan Perea ed., 1997).
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IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AND LATCRIT THEORY-THE FIRST
GENERATION
The indisputably suprasovereign nature of fundamental
human rights offers LatCrit theory fertile ground on which to
develop conceptions of law that will be of significance to the
comunidad latina as well as to all other communities in our
midst. For example, with sovereignty ceding to basic human
rights principles, it follows logically that human rights norms
can trump local law which derogates from such principles.
Considering current issues of interest and activism, the
immigration rights discourse provides a significant forum in
which to apply the theory to practice. It is beyond question that
a state has the sovereign right to enact immigration laws; how-
ever, human rights norms dictate that such a sovereign right is
not unfettered. While immigration norms can be, and are,
promulgated, such norms cannot derogate from fundamental
human rights principles. If a state, hiding behind the sover-
eignty shield attempts to treat similarly situated folks differ-
ently based upon grounds proscribed by human rights norms,
such as the broad nondiscrimination mandates that include lan-
guage, national origin, and conditions of birth, international
principles simply prohibit the state's conduct. These same non-
discrimination principles could be put to good use against the
welfare law, beyond the immigration provisions.
Last, but certainly not least, is the introduction of these ex-
citing panelists who will, by their conversations, focus on some of
the international human rights to which this introduction has
alerted the readers. Elvia Arriola from the University of Texas
is one of the leaders of "queer" theory, who has been doing some
fantastic LatCrit work. Her presentation focuses on Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service raids and the rights which are
placed in jeopardy by such raids. As far as human rights go, this
presentation raises issues of race, color, culture, and citizenship;
the rights to life, liberty, security of the person, and human dig-
nity; and the right to freedom of movement
The following presenter is Kevin Johnson who teaches at UC
Davis and has studied, represented persons in cases dealing
with, and has extensively written on immigration issues, par-
ticularly as they affect the Latina/o community. His panel dis-
cussion, entitled "Aliens and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The
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Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons scrutinizes how the
construction of the alien has allowed these noncitizens to be af-
forded limited rights, to be mistreated, and to be abused-a
timely topic in light of the recently signed pieces of legislation on
welfare and immigration. Again, this theme raises the issues of
global rights of others, in this instance, foreign others, outside
the jurisdiction of their nationality.
Last is Enid Trucios-Haynes who teaches at the University
of Louisville and has practiced, taught, and is writing up a storm
in the area of immigration. She focuses on "Transnational Iden-
tities and the Implication for Global Advocacy Strategies and
State Sovereignty." This presentation underscores the tension
between, on the one hand, the individual rights of those who, be-
cause of immigration, language, ancestry, or family have identi-
ties with transnational reach rather than a single national iden-
tity, and, on the other hand, the sovereign states for which
nationality is a crucial identifying factor for granting rights and
taking responsibilities vis A vis the individual.
All of these presentations weave a unified challenge to Lat-
Crit theorists: the identification of that fine balance of what is a
legitimate exercise of power by the state and what is the pretex-
tual overbearance of state power to others/outsiders, particularly
Latinas/os who often may be citizens by birth, but foreigned out
of full citizenship by name, language, color, accent or appear-
ance. How can we reconcile the deportation of citizens because
they look like their brothers and sisters from south of the
frontera with their birthright to be present and enjoy life in their
country and dignity to which all persons are entitled, free from
governmental obstruction and intrusion? How can we use the
diversity of Latina/o panethnicity to make international human
rights a reality in the life of the immigrant rather than aspira-
tional paper rights that leave the immigrant at the margins of
the discourse? How can we use that panethnic diverse experi-
ence to reconstruct the meaning of alien, after its deconstruction
shows its pretextual, thinly veiled patina aimed at contracting
basic human rights to disempower foreigners by rendering them
aliens, something less than human? How can we use the experi-
ences grounded in our multidimensionality, often including a
transnational identity(ies) factor, to make the indivisibility and
interdependence of that diversity central to the rights discourse?
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LatCrit offers the multifaceted experiences of numerous persons
who travel many worlds because of their Latina/o-ness. This ex-
perience and the successes we can share because of our non-
mainstream culture, color, ethnicity, and multilingualism while
traveling within our estadounidense home is a real life comple-
ment to the theoretical human rights framework. The interna-
tional paradigm recognizing, indeed mandating, the recognition
of a holistic rights construct-the indivisibility, inviolability, and
interdependence of rights-is a reflection of the lives of Lati-
nas/os whose multiple identities and multilingualism enable our
world-travelling.
And so what does LatCrit have to offer? It can serve to urge,
promote, and insist upon a local to universal theoretical con-
struct that eschews the single-trait, myopic approach of our sys-
tem of laws in favor of a holistic one that promotes the indivisi-
bility and interdependence of our identities. Rather than focus
on our differences, let our multilingualism be at the center of the
creation of a cohesive theory that insists upon our protections
notwithstanding our differences. And, this is of paramount im-
portance to Latinas/os, as well as Asians and others: our
panethnicity should be a source of strength rather than a pretext
for surrender. We are the diverse peoples-we are tall and
short; blond and brunette; blue-eyed and brown-eyed; we are
India/o, mestizao, blanca/o, morena/o, triguefia/o; men and
women; lesbian, gay, and straight; Catholic, Protestant, Santera,
and Jew; all levels of ability and education; all classes and relig-
ions; from all parts of the world, including all parts of the estados
unidos, yes, nuestros United States as well. It is time to eschew
the notions that our hyphenated entities are less than nonhy-
phenated ones. LatCrit and international human rights norms
are indispensable to the articulation of a cohesive, holistic para-
digm that effectively can develop, expand and transform the con-
tent and meaning of a rights construct.
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